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For Whom the Bell Tolls In the Aftermath
of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflections on
Forum Non Conveniens and Alternative
Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dispute
VED P. NANDA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over two years after the occurrence of the worst industrial accident
in history at a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India,' thousands of Bhopal resi-
dents still suffer from lingering effects. 2 A lawsuit brought by the Govern-
ment of India against Union Carbide is pending in the Bhopal district
court.3 As litigation drags on, the death toll continues to rise4 and legal
fees obviously keep mounting; but those suffering-the injured and the
families of the deceased alike- are without compensation. This comment
discusses two selected issues: (1) the decision of the federal district court
for the Southern District of New York to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens, which was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and (2) the need to explore other means, besides adjudi-
cation, to settle the Bhopal conflict. A brief factual setting precedes this
discussion to provide the necessary context for it.
II. THE SETTING 5
A massive leak of toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas occurred during
* Marsh Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, Univer-
sity of Denver College of Law; Distinguished Visiting Professor and Director of the Pacific-
Asian Legal Studies Program, Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii. I am deeply
indebted to my colleague, Jon Van Dyke, for helpful suggestions, and to Jeanette Laffoon,
class of 1987 at the University of Denver College of Law, for research assistance.
1. See generally Bhopal: What Really Happened?, Bus. India, Feb. 25-March 10, 1985,
at 102; Bhopal: City of Death, India Today, Dec. 31, 1984, at 6; Hazarika, Gas Leak in India
Kills at Least 410 in City of Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at Al, col. 6; Diamond, The
Bhopal Disaster: How It Happened, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
2. See Miller, Two Years After Bhopal's Gas Disaster, Lingering Effects Still Plague
Its People, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1986, at 30, col. 2.
3. For a recent report on the case, see Weisman, India Hopes to Speed Verdict on
Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at 31, col. 1.
4. See, e.g., Hazarika, India to Seek at Least $3 Billion From Union Carbide for Bho-
pal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at 10, col. 6; Meir & Miller, India Plans to Seek at Least $3
billion From Union Carbide for Bhopal Claims, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
5. See generally supra note 1. In writing this section I have drawn on two of my earlier
works -Remarks at the 79th annual meeting of the American society of International Law
in April 1985 in New York City, and Nanda & Bailey, Nature and Scope of the Problem, in
THE TRANSFER OF HAZANDOUS TECHNOLOGY: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHALLENGE (G.
Handl & R. Lutz eds. 1987).
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the night of December 2-3, 1984, at the Bhopal plant of Union Carbide,
India, Ltd. (UCIL), a subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation, A New
York corporation with headquarters in Danbury, Connecticut.' Union
Carbide owns 50.9 percent of the stock of its Indian subsidiary. The In-
dian government's reports put the death toll at 2,347, over 1,600 of whom
were killed as a direct result of the deadly gas leak, while the remaining
hundreds died because of its fatal effects over the next several months.
7
Those seriously injured number between 30,000 and 40,000 and the In-
dian Government received 500,000 leak-related claims.8 Lingering effects
include shortness of breath, eye irritation, and depression.'
In the proceedings before the Bhopal district court, the Indian gov-
ernment claimed that inadequate safety equipment at the plant and the
defective plant design Union Carbide supplied to UCIL were responsible
for the release of the lethal gas.10 It asserted that although Union Carbide
knew that safety equipment at the plant was inadequate, it did not take
remedial measures." The Indian government's assertion of defective
plant design is reportedly based on documents submitted to it by UCIL
between 1975 and 1981 requesting the extension of the employment of a
Union Carbide engineer, L.J. Couvaras, who served as project manager
during the construction of the Bhopal plant. 2 According to these docu-
ments, Couvaras was responsible for "the design, development, planning
and construction work" at the Bhopal plant, and for "detailed engineer-
ing" at the facility.1 3 Earlier, the Indian government had blamed Union
Carbide for errors in the design, management and oversight of the Bhopal
plant, resulting in unreasonable and "highly dangerous and defective
plant conditions."' 4 It enumerated among defective conditions inadequate
safety measures, faulty alarm systems, storage of huge quantities of toxic
chemicals and lack of cooling facilities. 5
In a memorandum presented to the federal district court for the
Southern District of New York, plaintiffs, including the Government of
India, had similarly claimed that Union Carbide was not only the creator
of the design used in the Bhopal plant but also had supervised and main-
tained the detailing phase during which no substantive change was made
6. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634
F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
7. See, e.g., Kramer, For Bhopal Survivors, Recovery is Agonizing, Illnesses are Insidi-
ous, Wall St. J., April 1, 1985, at 14, col. 2; Lewin, Carbide is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas
Disaster, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1985, at D2, col. 2.
8. See Miller, supra note 2.
9. See id.
10. See Meier, India Says a Union Carbide Engineer Was Responsible for Bhopal Site
Design, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1987, at 8, col. 1.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at cols. 1-2.
14. See Miller, supra note 2, at col. 3; Int'l Env't. Rptr. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 8, 1986); id., 343
(Oct. 8, 1986).
15. See Int'l Env. Rptr., Oct. 8, 1986, at 343.
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from Union Carbide's design. 6
Union Carbide, on the other hand, has contended that the responsi-
bility for the Bhopal tragedy lay with UCIL and the Government of India
and the state of Madhya Pravesh where the plant was located, for they
had the key role in operating and overseeing the plant.17 At the Bhopal
proceedings, the company asserted that while it had sold general design
drawings to UCIL it was the latter which had hired other companies to do
detailed design and construction."s Acknowledging that although it had
trained some of the plant managers, the company claimed that it was un-
able to dictate the plant's daily operations, for the government of India
had barred it from running the plant. 9
In support of its assertion that the Government of India and Madhya
Pravesh must share the responsibility for the accident, Union Carbide has
contended:
[T]he Indian government had approved and inspected the plant, knew
about the dangers of MIC and refused to allow American employees
from Carbide to remain in India to provide technical assistance re-
quested by its subsidiary to the Indians running the plant. ... [Tihe
state government in Bhopal had allowed people to move close to the
plant fence knowing the dangers they would face in an accident."0
Earlier, in New York proceedings, Union Carbide presented several
affidavits designed to refute the contention that it was responsible for the
design and construction of the plant.2 According to the affidavit of Ranjit
K. Dutta, who was employed as General Manager of the Agricultural
Products Division of UCIL from 1973 to 1976, "at no time were Union
Carbide Corporation engineering personnel from the United States in-
volved in approving the detail design or drawings prepared upon which
construction was based. Nor did they receive notices of changes made." 2
The Bhopal court will have to sort out questions regarding the safety
of the plant design and the adequacy of the key safety equipment and
operating systems at the Bhopal plant. While the issues of responsibility
and liability remain to be resolved and uncertainty still surrounds the
causes for malfunctioning of some of the safety devices,2" this much is
certain-that all emergency safety devices failed and there was no early
16. See Memo at 17-20, cited in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bho-
pal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp 842, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
17. See Miller, supra note 2, at col. 3; Diamond, Carbide Gives Details on Its Sabotage
Claim, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1986, at 29, col. 1.
18. See In re Union Carbide Corp. at 856-57.
19. See Diamond, supra note 1, at 43, col. 1.
20. Id. at 29, col. 2.
21. See In re Union Carbide Corp. at 856-58.
22. Cited in id. at 857.
23. See, e.g., Union Carbide's assertion that a disgruntled UCIL worker or group of
workers caused the leak. See Diamond, supra note 17.
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warning of impending trouble.24 Because of instrumentation faults, the
monitoring gauges did not work and mechanical valves which were to act
as a backup measure were apparently dysfunctional. The vent gas scrub-
ber (VGS), designed to neutralize any leaking MIC by automatically
"washing" it with caustic soda and rendering it harmless, was shut off
when the escape occurred, and the flare tower which was supposed to
burn escaping gas was also shut down. But, according to one report, "be-
cause of faulty design, both the VGS and flame tower together could not
have prevented the MIC from escaping into the atmosphere. 2 5
As evidence of a faulty plant design, it was reported that no backup
system was provided to prevent the kind of gas escape that occurred at
the Bhopal plant, that safety measures used elsewhere by Union Carbide,
such as a computerized pressure/temperature sensing system, and other
effective alternatives, were nonexistent. 6 A reporter concluded after a
study of the design analysis of the MIC storage area:
First, that a short-sighted design modification made in the pipeline
connections, less than a year ago, along with the dysfunctioning of
some valves, was primarily responsible for water ingress in the MIC
tank. And second, the original design of the MIC storage area did not
provide for even a single safe route for a toxic gas at a very high tem-
perature and pressure to be neutralized before escaping into the atmo-
sphere. In other words, the safety features were grossly under-
designed.27
In addition to questions raised about fault in plant design and stor-
age of excessive amounts of MIC at the plant,2" other issues still to be
resolved include whether negligence on the part of the employees or man-
agement was responsible for the accident, whether sabotage was involved,
whether employees' training measures and plant operating and mainte-
nance procedures were adequate, and whether existing government regu-
lations on occupation, and of safety and health issues which were applica-
ble to the Bhopal operation are adequate and were followed. Other
pertinent questions relate to the management's role in educating the pub-
lic on the risks of MIC leak and the use of safety procedures were such a
leak to occur, and in providing adequate warning systems to those in the
vicinity of the plant and prompt medical assistance to victims.
Litigation began both in U.S. and Indian courts in the wake of the
Bhopal tragedy." The Indian government adopted the Bhopal Gas Leak
24. See generally Bhopal: What Really Happened?, supra note 1.
25. Id. at 105.
26. See generally id. at 104-105.
27. Id. at 103.
28. See, e.g., claim by plaintiffs that it was Union Carbide's fault to authorize excessive
storage of MIC at the plant. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India
in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
29. See, e.g., Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the
Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 273, 290 (1985); Stevens, U.S. Lawyers Are Arriving
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Disaster Ordinance on February 20, 1985, and a month later, on March
29, enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, s"
under which the government of India assumed responsibility as the sole
representative of all the victims of the gas leak to bring a single action
against Union Carbide. Subsequently, in April 1985, the Indian govern-
ment, on behalf of the victims, filed as parens patriae a lawsuit against
Union Carbide in the federal district court for the Southern District of
New York, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages in an un-
specified amount,31 invoking six separate theories of liability on the part
of Union Carbide-absolute liability, strict liability, negligence, breach of
warranty, misrepresentation, and the multinational enterprise liability
theory." Earlier, the government of India had rejected a Union Carbide
offer to settle the controversy for $200 million dollars.33
The U.S. lawyers filed a lawsuit in India challenging the Indian gov-
ernment's action of filing a lawsuit on behalf of all the victims in the
United States,3 ' alleging that the Bhopal Act violated the right of Indian
citizens under the Constitution of India to choose their own counsel, and
alleging a conflict of interest by the Indian government, for it could not
represent the victims because of its shared responsibility for the disaster
by failing to enforce safety regulations. 5
The Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all the
lawsuits brought in the United States in federal district court in the
Southern District of New York." On May 12, 1986, District Judge Kee-
nan dismissed the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens under
three conditions: first, that Union Carbide consent to submit to the juris-
diction of the courts of India and continue to waive defense based upon
the statute of limitations; second, that Union Carbide agree to satisfy any
judgment rendered against it by an Indian court, provided that the mini-
mal requirements of due process are met; and third, that Union Carbide
comply with U.S. rules of discovery under the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3 7
to Prepare Big Damage Suits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
30. Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Ordinance, No. 1 of 1985, Feb. 20, 1985. The text of the
March 19, 1985, Act is reproduced in 25 I.L.M. 884 (1986). For an insightful comment, see
Deshpande, The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act 1985, 27 J. INDIAN L.
INST. 23 (1985).
31. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 844; Galanter, supra note 29, at
286; Riley, Bhopal: The Legal Escalation Begins in Earnest, Nat'l L. J., April 22, 1985, at 8,
col. 1; Lewin, Carbide Is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas Disaster, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1985,
at 1, col. 5.
32. See Riley, supra note 31.
33. See Galanter, supra note 29, at 285.
34. See Riley, supra note 31, at 8, col. 3.
35. See Lewin, supra note 31, at D2, col 4.
36. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
37. See id. at 867.
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Efforts at a negotiated settlement did not succeed as the Indian gov-
ernment rejected a Union Carbide offer of 350 million dollars, an offer
accepted by lawyers representing private plaintiffs in litigation s.3  Attor-
neys for the individual plaintiffs in the Bhopal case appealed the ruling
by Judge Keenan that sent the proceedings to India." Union Carbide
cross-appealed the judge's ruling contending that the Indian government
must also be bound by U.S.-style discovery rules, and that Judge Keenan
should retain authority to monitor the Indian court proceedings and be
available to rectify any possible abuses of Union Carbide's right to due
process in India.'" Subsequently, on September 5, 1986, the Indian gov-
ernment sued Union Carbide in the Bhopal district court in India for
damages arising out of the gas leak,'4 1 seeking at least 3 billion dollars.
4 2
In January 1987, the second circuit court of appeals reversed the fed-
eral district court and held that both Union Carbide and the Indian gov-
ernment must have equal access to evidence, thus granting Union Carbide
U.S.-style discovery powers as well.48 However, it rejected Union Car-
bide's proposed remedy regarding supervision of the Indian court pro-
ceedings by Judge Keenan as "impractical" and evidencing "an abysmal
ignorance of basic jurisdictional principles, so much so that it borders on
the frivolous."" Otherwise, it affirmed the district court.45
III. THE APPLICATION OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
4 s
A. Gilbert and Piper Standards
The district court dismissed the actions, applying the standards
enunciated earlier by the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert4' and Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.48 In Gilbert and its compan-
ion case, Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,"' decided in 1947,
the Supreme Court established the parameters for the application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, which it subsequently reviewed in
Piper in 1981. Piper added two distinct principles to the Gilbert balanc-
ing test of private and public interest factors."'
38. See Int'l Env't. Rptr. (BNA) 107 (April 9, 1986).
39. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987)[hereinafter Gas Plant Disaster].
40. See id. at 202.
41. See Int'l En'tv. Rptr. (BNA) 343 (Oct. 8, 1986).
42. See Hazarika, supra note 4, Meir & Miller, supra note 4.
43. See Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d at 206.
44. Id. at 205.
45. Id.
46. For a discussion of forum non conveniens, see generally The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens, in V. Nanda & D. Pansius, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S.
COURTS ch. IV (1986).
47. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
48. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
49. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
50. See notes 60, 62-64 infra.
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At the outset it is useful to recall the Supreme Court's articulation of
what it considered the "ultimate inquiry" in the application of the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, that is, "where trial will best serve the
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice."'" Thus the basic poli-
cies underlying the doctrine as a touchstone were the parties' convenience
and justice. In Gilbert the court said that "the plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed," unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant.5 2 The district court may, however, dismiss the case in its
sound discretion when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the
case. The Court enumerated certain private and public factors to be con-
sidered in exercising its jurisdiction."
Piper, which was a wrongful death action, involved an airplane crash
in Scotland. All decedents and beneficiaries were foreigners. Applying the
balancing test of Gilbert, the district court dismissed the case on forum
non conveniens grounds." Acknowledging that a plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum ordinarily deserves substantial deference, the court observed that
"the courts have been less solicitous when the plaintiff is not an American
citizen or resident, and particularly, when the foreign citizens seek to
benefit from the more liberal test rules provided for the protection of citi-
zens and residents of the United States." 56 Rejecting the plaintiffs' con-
tention that Scottish law was less favorable and hence dismissal would be
unfair, the court said that change in the substantive law because of the
dismissal deserves no significant weight, for any deficiency in the forum
law was a "matter to be dealt with in the foreign forum."56
On appeal, the third circuit court of appeals reversed and remanded
for trial57 on the ground that the district court abused its discretion in its
application of the balancing factors set forth in Gilbert,58 and on the al-
ternative ground that dismissal under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens is not permissible where the law of the alternative forum is less
favorable to the plaintiff."
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme court upheld the district court, stat-
ing that, "[blecause the central purpose of any forum non conveniens in-
quiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice
deserves less deference."60 Earlier, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc,
had held in a 1981 case 1 that the plaintiff's citizenship was not a proper
factor in a forum non conveniens inquiry.
51. 330 U.S. at 527.
52. 330 U.S. at 508.
53. See id.
54. Reyno v Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
55. Id. at 731.
56. Id. at 738.
57. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980).
58. See id. at 162-63.
59. See id. at 164.
60. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981).
61. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1981).
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The Supreme Court approved the district court's application of the
private and public interest factors in accordance with Gilbert's balancing
test. It also upheld the district court in stating that the impact of a
change in substantive law because of dismissal on the ground of forum
non conveniens should ordinarily not be given "conclusive or even sub-
stantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry."62 In the Court's
words, "if conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of
a change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtu-
ally useless."6 However, it left the door open for taking into considera-
tion an unfavorable change in law, for"if the remedy provided by the al-
ternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no
remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial
weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the
interests of justice." 4
At the outset, the district court followed the Piper rationale in con-
cluding that, because plaintiffs were not United States residents, their
choice of the United States forum would be given "'less deference' than
would be accorded a United States citizen's choice." 5 It then turned to
the question of the effect on plaintiffs' claims of a change in law if the
case were transferred to India. Following Piper, however, the court fo-
cused its inquiry on the question whether the remedy provided to the
plaintiffs in India would be "so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory" that
it would be "no remedy at all."
The court noted that Union Carbide was "definitely amenable to pro-
cess in India"66 , because it had unequivocally accepted the jurisdiction of
Indian courts. Next, the court discussed the alleged inadequacy of the
Indian legal system to handle the Bhopal litigation and conducted a re-
view of affidavits by plaintiffs' and defendants' experts on the Indian le-
gal system.6" The court specifically addressed the alleged delays and
backlogs in Indian courts, the state of tort law in India, and procedural
and practical capacity of Indian courts. The court concluded:
[Tihe courts of India appear to be well up to the task of handling this
case. Any unfavorable change in law for plaintiffs which might be suf-
fered upon transfer to the Indian courts, will, by the rule of Piper, not
be given "substantial weight." Differences between the two legal sys-
tems, even if they inure to plaintiffs' detriment, do not suggest that
India is not an adequate alternative forum.68
However, the court imposed two conditions as prerequisites to dis-
62. 454 U.S. at 247.
63. Id. at 250.
64. Id. at 254.
65. See in re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), citing Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 256, 261.
66. Id. at 847.
67. See id. at 847-52.
68. Id. at 852.
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missal; one, that Union Carbide submit to discovery on the American
model.", and, two, that it agree to be bound by and to satisfy the judg-
ment of the Indian tribunal.
7
1
The court then determined that the private interest factors
"weigh[ed] greatly in favor of dismissal on grounds of forum non con-
veniens."' It found that relative ease of access to sources of proof bearing
on liability favored dismissal, for most of the documentary evidence con-
cerning design, manufacture and operation of the Bhopal plant, training
of employees, and issues of safety, was to be found in India. 2 Similarly,
the court found that consideration of the other two factors articulated in
Gilbert, ease of access to witnesses,73 and the ease of arranging a view of
the premises should one be required,74 also favored dismissal.
Finally, the court considered three factors under the public interest
concerns: administrative difficulties of hearing the case in New York; 5
the relative concerns of India and the United States;76 and the relative
capability of an Indian versus a U.S. court in applying Indian law to the
case which the court found to be the applicable choice of law.7 Here
again it concluded, as it did earlier after a review of the private interest
concerns, that public interest factors weighed heavily in favor of dismis-
sal, for the plant was heavily regulated by the Indian government, and
"[n]o American interest in the outcome of this litigation outweighs the
interest of India in applying Indian law and Indian values to the task of
resolving this case.
'78
Responding to the plaintiffs' assertion that the Indian justice system
had "not yet cast off the burden of colonialism to meet the emerging
needs of a democratic people,' 79 the court said that, in its view,
to retain the litigation in this forum, as plaintiffs request, would be
yet another example of imperialism, another situation in which an es-
tablished sovereign inflicted its rules, its standards and values on a
developing nation. This Court declines to play such a role. The Union
of India is a world power in 1986, and its courts have the proven ca-
pacity to mete out fair and equal justice. To deprive the Indian judici-
ary of this opportunity to stand tall before the world and to pass judg-
ment on behalf of its own people would be to revive a history of
subservience and subjugation from which India has emerged. India
and its people can and must vindicate their claims before the inde-
69. See id. at 850.
70. See id. at 852.
71. Id. at 860.
72. See id. at 853-59.
73. See id. at 859-60.
74. See id. at 860.
75. See id. at 861-62.
76. See id. at 862-66.
77. See id at 866.
78. Id. at 867.
79. Id.
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pendent and legitimate judiciary created there since the Independence
of 1947.8
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court, but, after
reviewing the conditions imposed by the district court on Union Carbide,
it struck the condition that the company consent to the enforcement of a
final Indian judgment and modified the other, that it consent to broad
discovery under American rules, ordering that it
be deleted without prejudice to the right of the parties to have recip-
rocal discovery of each other on equal terms under the Federal Rules,
subject to such approval as may be required of the Indian court in
which the case will be pending. If, for instance, Indian authorities will
permit mutual discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules, the district
court's order, as modified in accordance with this option, should not
be construed to bar such procedure. In the absence of such a court-
sanctioned agreement, however, the parties will be limited by the ap-
plicable discovery rules of the Indian court in which the claims will be
pending."'
Even though the courts said that they were simply applying perti-
nent standards and balancing factors on a forum non conveniens inquiry
as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, I consider these opin-
ions deserving of special attention, at least on three counts, and will con-
sequently discuss these three issues: (1) the courts' observations on the
Indian legal system; (2) the courts' treatment of the citizenship factor in
forum non conveniens inquiry; and (3) the courts' discussion of U.S. ver-
sus Indian interests in its consideration of the public interest factors.
B. The Courts' Observations on the Indian Legal System
In their comments on the impact of differences between American
and foreign legal systems to determine whether the foreign forum meets
the standard of being "an adequate alternative" forum under the Piper
articulation, the courts show appropriate regard for and sensitivity to for-
eign legal systems. The district court "defer[red] to the adequacy and
ability of the courts of India," 2 and cited with approval the statement of
an expert on the Indian legal system from his affidavit that "[d]ifference
is not to be equated with deficiency." 3
On appeal, the Second Circuit responded to Union Carbide's plea
that it be protected against a possible denial of due process in Indian
courts by the U.S. district court retaining the authority "to monitor the
Indian court proceedings and [to] be available on call to rectify in some
undefined way any abuses to [Union Carbide's] right to due process as
80. Id.
81. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 206 (2d Cir 1987).
82. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 867.
83. Id. at 853.
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they might occur in India." ' In emphatically rejecting Union Carbide's
proposed remedy as bordering "on the frivolous," the court added: "Nor
could we, even if we attempted to retain some sort of supervisory jurisdic-
tion, impose our due process requirements upon Indian courts, which are
governed by their laws, not ours."85
It is certainly appropriate for U.S. courts to inquire into the proce-
dural and substantive aspects of a foreign legal system to determine
whether the basic due process protections will be available to a defendant
in a foreign forum. However, the criteria applied to determine the out-
come of such inquiry are not to be a carbon copy of U.S. standards, for
dissimilarity is not to be associated with incompetence, inadequacy or in-
ability. In such an inquiry international standards should be applied,
which is a routine practice by many courts in conflict of laws cases involv-
ing enforcement of a foreign state's money judgment."6 This necessitates a
review by the forum of the foreign state's jurisdictional principles and
notice requirements, in addition to a preliminary determination that the
foreign tribunals are available and are fair and competent, and that the
foreign legal system does provide procedures compatible with due process
of law. Following such an inquiry the court should defer to the foreign
forum in a spirit of cooperation rather than judicial parochialism.
The District Court opinion could be read as having opted for judicial
comity over judicial parochialism. For Judge Keenan pays a compliment
to the Indian Legal system by observing that "the courts of India appear
to be well up to the task of handling the case."8 " However, Judge Kee-
nan's review of the plaintiffs' assertion that the Indian legal system is
incapable of handling the Bhopal litigation leaves many questions unan-
swered. For example, he fails to address the plaintiffs' contention con-
tained in Professor Marc Galanter's affadavit that "Indian legal institu-
tions still reflect their colonial origins," suffering from a lack of broad-
based legislative activity, inaccessability to legal information and legal
services, burdensome court filing fees and limited innovativeness pertain-
ing to legal practice and education."
Relying on the affidavits of defendant's experts for the suffestion
that a developed and independent judiciary exists in India, Judge Keenan
84. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d at 205.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 263
(1962); 78 N.Y. Cir. Prac. L.R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 1978); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See Gene, Valley, Birnbaum &
Wrubel, Foreign Plaintiffs and the American Manufacturer: Is a Court in the United
States a Forum Non Conveniens?, 20 FORUM 59 (1984); Rosato, Restoring Justice to the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens for Foreign Plaintiffs Who Sue U.S. Corporations in
the Federal Courts, 8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MARKET L. 169 (1986); Note, Forum Non
Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CH. L. REV. 373 (1980).
87. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 852.
88. See Galanter Affadavit at 11-12, cited in In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp at
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concluded that "[pilaintiffs present no evidence to bolster their conten-
tion that the Indian legal system has not sufficiently emerged from its
colonial heritage to display the innovativeness which the Bhopal litigation
would demand. Their claim in this regard is not compelling."8 9
India's claim on this issue merited careful scrutiny, no a summary
rejection, especially since the defendant's experts had not rebutted the
precise contention that India's colonial legacy impeded the innovative po-
tential of its judiciary.90
On the related issue of endemic delays in the Indian legal system,
Judge Keenan remarked that "United States courts are subject to delays
and backlogs too," 9 and concluded, again in reliance on the affidavits of
the defendant's experts, that through judicial accommodation the Indian
judiciary could handle the Bhopal litigation, the court failed to acknowl-
edge the conclusion reached by another district court in 1982 in In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Bombay,9' that "an early decision in the courts of
India would be improbable."' 3 The court in that case took judicial notice
of the extensive delays that are a routine part of the Indian judicial sys-
tem.'4 And the pace of litigation in Bhopal thus far does not bear out the
promise of a speedy and effective trial. The transfer of the presiding
judge, G.S. Patel, in February, 1987, the third such judge to be trans-
ferred from Bhopal district court since the trial began there, adds further
uncertainty and likely delay in the proceedings."
Finally, on the issue of "procedural and practical capacity of Indian
courts," the plaintiffs' contention was that the Indian legal system lacks
the wherewithal "to deal effectively and expeditiously with the issues
raised in the lawsuit.""' Judge Keenan discussed the Indian bar's ability
to handle the Bhopal litigation, the state of tort law in India, the alleged
lack of procedural devices, such as discovery, third-party impleader, or-
ganization of complex litigation, class action procedure, and unavailabil-
ity of juries or contingent fee arrangements in India, which are essential
to the adjudication of complex issues, and concluded that the Indian legal
system provides an adequate alternative forum. He said, "Differences be-
tween the two legal systems even if they inure to plaintiffs' detriment, do
not suggest that India is not an adequate alternative forum."' 7
89. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp at 848.
90. See generally Baxi, Introduction: Towards the Revictimization of the Bhopal Vic-
tims, in INCONVENIENT FORUM AND CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPAL CASE 1 (Indian
Law Institute, New Delhi 1986).
91. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 848.
92. 531 F. Supp. 1175 (1982).
93. Id. at 1181.
94. Id. at 1181, n. 7
95. See Weisman, Bhopal Judge Taken Off Case, N.Y. Times, Feb 26, 1987, at 29, col.
3; Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 97 (Mar. 11, 1987.).
96. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F.
Supp. 842, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
97. Id. at 852.
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It is noteworthy that the government of India was alleging institu-
tional inadequacy of the the Indian legal system, coupled with the ab-
sence of a well developed doctrine of tort law in India to expeditiously
and equitably cope with the issues of multinational liability involving
high technology, complex manufacturing processes, and mass disaster. As
Professor Upendera Baxi reminds us, "[I]t was not a mere claim favour-
ing plaintiff with the choice of American law as in Piper."'98
C. Treatment of the Citizenship Factor
On the second issue, the plaintiff's citizenship, the district court did
not consider foreign citizenship of the plaintiffs as the determining factor
in ordering dismissal. Relying on the Piper teaching that "a foreign plain-
tiff's choice deserves less deference,"99 the court stated that "the assump-
tion that this forum is convenient is not completely reasonable," and
hence decided to "apply the presumption in favor of plaintiffs' choice of
forum with less than maximum force."' 0 In the same vein, the Second
Circuit said that "[1]ittle or no deference can be paid to the plaintiffs'
choice of a United States forum when all but a few of the 200,000 plain-
tiffs are Indian citizens."' 0 '
Perhaps the district court treated the issue of plaintiff's citizenship
summarily because of its findings that both the private and public inter-
est factors weighed heavily in favor of dismissal. However, its observation,
correlating convenience with citizenship, invites comment. In support of
its position, the court relied on Koster, which had suggested that a plain-
tiff's choice of a home forum should be given greater deference, 102 and on
Piper which, citing Koster with approval, further stated in a summary
fashion that in the converse situation, where a foreign plaintiff chooses a
U.S. court, that choice deserves "less deference."'0 3
A careful reading of Piper shows that while it did approve of the
Koster formulation of the presumption in question, it cited Pain v.
United Technologies Corp.' 4 for the proposition that "citizenship and
residence are proxies for convenience.'" 08 However, Pain explicitly re-
jected according presumptive weight to an American citizen's choice of a
U.S. forum, stating instead that, "[alt best, citizenship serves as an inade-
quate proxy for the American residence of plaintiff, which in turn is only
one indicator of how inconvenient it may be for the plaintiff to litigate
his case in a foreign forum, as measured by the Gilbert factors of private
98. Baxi, supra note 90, at 16.
99. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, at 256 n. 24 (1981).
100. In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 845.
101. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
102. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524.
103. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56.
104. 637 F.2d 775, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
105. Piper, 454 U.S. at 256 n. 24.
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interest.' 6
Also, while citing Koster, Piper did acknowledge in a footnote that
[a] citizen's forum choice should not be given dispositive wight, how-
ever... Citizens or residents deserve somewhat more deference than
foreign plaintiffs, but dismissal should not be automatically barred
when a plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum. As always, if the
balance of conveniences suggests that trial in the chosen forum would
be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or the court, dismissal
is proper.107
Pain, in fact, had explicitly stated that, "[ulpon examination the factor of
American citizenship per se proves largely irrelevant to the factors which
Gilbert-Koster required courts to consider when making forum non con-
veniens determinations."' 0 8
Also, while Piper cited to a comment in the University of Chicago
Law Review for its proposition that "a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves
less defense," the comment in fact cautioned that while "it is entirely
proper that characteristic [that make foreign litigation inconvenient for
American citizens] be weighed in a court's balancing of the parties' incon-
veniences [,] ... American citizenship, as such correlates imperfectly with
those characteristics, and therefore should not be used a a facile proxy of
the plaintiff's convenience."'0 9
On the question of appropriate weight to be given to a plaintiff's citi-
zenship in the forum non conveniens inquiry, two earlier opinions of the
Second Circuit, Farmanfarmain v. Gulf Oil Corp.,"' decided in 1978, and
Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc., v. M/V Nordic Agent,"' decided two years later, pro-
vide a more reasoned approach. In the former, the court held that under a
bilateral treaty a foreign plaintiff had to be treated like an American
plaintiff, when the treaty, like other Treaties of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, granted the foreign national "access to [this] country's
courts on terms no less favorable than those applicable to nationals of the
court's country.""1 2 In the latter case, the court urged a uniform standard
for determining forum non conveniences motions, after noting that "[the
trend of both the common law and admiralty law in particular has been
away from according a talismanic significance to the citizenship or resi-




Assume that UCIL was still employing U.S. engineers and supervi-
sors who lived in a compound next to the Bhopal plant, and that the leak
which was soon plugged caused injuries to fifteen U.S. citizens and two
106. Pain, 637 F.2d at 797 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
107. Piper, 454 U.S. at 256 n. 23.
108. Pain, 637 F.2d at 775 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
109. Note, supra note 86, at 383 (footnote omitted).
110. 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
111. 654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1980).
112. Farmanfarmain, 588 F.2d at 882, citing 8 U.S.T. 900, 902-903 (1957).
113. Alcoa, 654 F2d at 154. See generally, id. at 154-56.
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Indian citizens. All seventeen of them brought an action in a U.S. court
alleging negligence on the part of Union Carbide. Should the citizenship
of the plaintiffs determine the outcome of a motion for dismissal on the
ground of forum non conveniens by the defendant? This hypothetical
suggests that in a modern world of shrinking distance and where corpora-
tions choose residences and citizenships to suit corporate needs, the fac-
tor of citizenship in the calculus of forum non conveniens needs
reappraisal.
Since the district court was not prepared to undertake such an ap-
praisal, and since there is no necessary correlation between citizenship or
residence on the one hand and convenience or justice on the other, why
elevate this factor in a forum non conveniens inquiry and why even refer
to it in the case?
D. Private and Public Interest Concerns
Judge Keenan's discussion of private interest concerns is quite de-
tailed. " 4 I would submit that if Judge Keenan had addressed with speci-
ficity India's contention that Union Carbide was responsible and hence
liable for defective plant design at Bhopal and that as a multinational
enterprise it engaged in a complex, interlocking control system over all its
subsidiaries, he might have reached different conclusions on questions
pertaining to sources of proof and access to witnesses.' "
In the balancing of U.S. versus Indian interests in the public interest
calculus, the court properly inquired into the relative interest of each
country. How much weight should the district court have given to the
choice of a U.S. forum by the government of India? Should the court take
into account comity as a factor? As Professor Baxi observes, this unprece-
dented decision to bring the action in the United States was "by itself the
highest affirmation of the Indian public interest. And that determination
signified that while the Indian vision of development is tolerant of impor-
tation of hazardous technology, it does not and will not tolerate a 'lower
standard abroad' in designing of plan and safety relief systems by an
American multinational. In altogether ignoring this affirmation of the
public interest by the sovereign state of India, Judge Keenan has in fact
been grossly paternalistic.' 1 6 Also, the court brushed off the plaintiff's
argument that the trial in a U.S. court would have a deterrent effect on a
U.S. company exporting hazardous industry abroad by again citing from
Piper that:
[T]he incremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were
held in an American court is likely to be insignificant. The American
interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to justify the enor-
114. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634
F. Supp. 842, 852-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
115. For a comprehensive analysis on these issues, see Baxi, supra not 90, at 22-27.
116. Id. at 30.
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mous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevita-
bly be required if the case were to be tried here."'
It also rejected the argument that a U.S. proceeding would avoid cre-
ating "double standard" of liability and would prevent possible "black-
mail effect of dismissal." In response, the court said that "it should avoid
imposing characteristically American values on Indian concerns.""'
While conceding the moral danger of creating a "double standards," the
court said: "however, when an industry is as regulated as the chemical
industry is in India, the failure to acknowledge inherent differences in the
aims and concerns of Indian, as compared to American citizens would be
naive, and unfair to defendant.""'
The court found the Indian interest in creating, enforcing or even
extending standards of care and protecting its citizens from ill-use as
"significantly stronger" than the U.S. interest in deterring multinational
corporations from exporting allegedly dangerous technology.1 20 Finally,
the court said that "the purported public interest of seizing this chance to
create new law is no real interest at all,'1 2 ' and that it would exceed its
authority were it to rule otherwise.1
2
As to what kind of regulations should apply to multinationals en-
gaged in the export of hazardous technologies or products and as to who
should prescribe and enforce them - self regulation, host state's laws,
home state's laws, international environmental standards - are questions
beyond the scope of this comment.'23 The courts are not legislators, nor
were they asked to act as one by the plaintiffs in the Bhopal case. Also,
since there is no U.S. statute as yet which mandates that a foreign plain-
tiff injured by a U.S. multinational's activities abroad have access to U.S.
courts, a desirable step in my estimation, the issue before the court sim-
ply was to balance U.S. and Indian interest.
The court correctly identified India's interest in setting and enforcing
standards in an industry it invited into the country in the first place and
now regulates. However, it gave a short shrift to the U.S. interest as the
home country, both for the deterrent value of a U.S. proceeding and also
to ensure that double standards are not set. There is certainly support in
earlier decisions, mostly related to pharmaceutical industries, for the
court's insistence that it was attempting to avoid the imposition of what
it called "characteristically American values on Indian concerns."124
117. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260-61 (1981), cited in In re Union
Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 862.





123. See generally Nanda & Bailey, supra note 5.
124. See, e.g., Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa, 1980), aff'd
mem., 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.
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However, this attitude, seemingly noble, of not appearing to be pa-
ternalistic, shields defendant U.S. companies and smacks of benign neg-
lect. Taken to its logical extreme, it implies that a host country without
the necessary technical ability or wherewithal to regulate hazardous in-
dustries it invites from abroad has to fend for itself, for otherwise U.S.
courts might be criticized from imposing U.S. values on their concerns.
These concerns regarding safety and the value of human life, I sub-
mit, are in many instances identical for both the host and the home coun-
try, and the courts must undertake a contextual analysis to determine
whether it would be convenient to the parties and just in outcome for the
court to dismiss the case in favor of a foreign forum, for these are the
basic policy considerations underlying a forum non conveniens inquiry.
Such analysis will include a consideration of several factors such as the
nexus of the litigation with the forum and special characteristics of the
lawsuit which might have a bearing on the issues of convenience and
justice.
The court mechanically applied the Gilbert public interest factors
and concluded that, on balance, India's interests weighed more heavily
than those of the United States. It did not consider comity as a factor in
the equation. The pharmaceutical cases Judge Keenan cited to support
his conclusion are clearly distinguishable from the Bhopal case, and the
language he used on the respective values of the two countries was inap-
posite. To reiterate, it would be desirable for the courts to focus their
inquiry on forum non conveniens motions squarely on convenience and
justice. If Judge Keenan had done so, the answer would not have been as
clear-cut as his opinion makes it out to be.
IV. WHY NOT SETTLEMENT?
The adjudication drags on with no end in sight. As of mid-January
there were no negotiations underway between Union Carbide and the
government of India to reach an out-of-court settlement."5 The latest
salvo in the litigation battle was fired in January 1987 by the plaintiffs'
lawyers at the Bhopal proceedings. They outlined their strategy to invoke
"multinational enterprise liability" theory for imposition of liability on
Union Carbide."2 6 Under this theory a multinational corporation which
controls a majority interest in a hazardous enterprise has a "knowledgea-
ble duty to assure that the activity does not cause harm.'
The theory was apparently accepted by a panel of the Indian Su-
preme Court decided in December 1986 to impose liability on the top
Ohio 1982), modified sub nom. Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608 (6th Cir.
1984).
125. See Weisman, India Hopes to Speed Verdict on Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1987, at 31, cols. 1-2.
126. See Id. at cols. 2-4.
127. Id. at col. 2.
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management of a company in a chemical leak case, holding that the man-
agement "had an absolute and non-delegate authority" to ensure that its
hazardous facilities are safe,12 and that "no harm results to anyone on
account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity
which it has undertaken."129 The court found it "necessary to construct a
new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has
arisen. . .on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries
which are concomitant to an industrial economy . ". ." 1
This theory is an extension of Rylands v. Fletcher' into a new prin-
ciple of "strict and absolute" liability as to the measure of compensation
in such cases, the court held that it "must be correlated tot he magnitude
and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a
deterrent effect." '32 In reliance on the holding of that case, a U.S. lawyer
assisting the government of India suggested that to win its case before the
Bhopal court the government did not have to prove even negligence but
simply that the activity was ultrahazardous and that it caused damage.'33
It is yet to be seen if the Bhopal court would accept this or any of the
several other theories under which the United States parent company
could be held liable.'3 4 The major concerns with litigation, however, are
among others, its cost, a lengthy process, a hardening of positions, and
the outcome which invariably is a zero-sum game with winners and losers.
And the process takes its toll on the victims and their families who pa-
tiently keep waiting for compensation.
It is not within the scope of this comment to explore the relative
advantages and disadvantages of litigation versus alternative dispute res-
olution (ADR) techniques. Voluminous literature, which keeps growing,
exists on ADR. s5 In the resolution of the United States environmental
disputes especially, the use of negotiation and mediation techniques has
advanced far beyond the experimental stage."3 6
128. See id. at col. 3.
129. See Mehta v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 12739 of 1985, 20 Dec.
1986, at 30. A copy of the memorandum opinion is on file at the office of the Denver Journal
of International Law & Policy.
130. Id.
131. [1868] 2 H.L. 330.
132. Mehta v. Union of India, supra note 129, at 32. For an analysis, see Baxi & Dias,
Shriram Judgement-Companies 'Absolutely Liable' for Industrial Hazards, Bus. India,
Jan. 12-25, 1987, at 40.
133. See Weisman, supra note 125; at cols. 4-5.
134. See, e.g., Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for
an International Settlement, 20 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 321 (1985).
135. See, e.g., S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985), and id.
at 577-88 for a bibliography.
136. See, e.g., L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984);
T. SULLIVAN, RESOLVING DEVELOPMENT DISPUTES THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS (1984); RESOLVING
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DISPUTES (L. Susskind, L. Bacow & M. Wheeler eds, 1984);
Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261; Barnes, Environ-
mental Mediation: A Tool for Resolving International Environmental disputes in the "Pa-
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The continuing delay in resolving the Bhopal case adds to the im-
mensity of the Bhopal tragedy. It seems imperative that the immensity of
the ADR techniques such as mediation and conciliation be tried to re-
solve the Bhopal conflict without further delay. For the real losers thus
far have been the victims and their families who desperately need the aid.
Similarly, authorities in Bhopal urgently need financial resources to pro-
vide medical and social services to the needy and to undertake commu-
nity development projects. The immediate needs include proper medical
facilities and jobs because the shutting down of the Union Carbide plant,
which was the main source of employment in Bhopal, has caused severe
hardship. Ample resources are needed for bringing cottage industries to
Bhopal, for providing vocational training to the unemployed workers, and
for social services, including day care and educational facilities.
Perhaps it will be helpful to the parties and mediators or facilitators
(if they were used) to know why prior attempts at negotiation in the Bho-
pal dispute failed. In a recent commentary on dispute resolution, as many
as 11 factors were identified as responsible for such failures, including
constituency pressures, different perceptions of alternatives to agreement,
emotionalism, and failure of effective communication.1
3 7
The undisputed fact is that Union Carbide owns 50.9 percent of the
stock of UCIL, and the real dispute concerns the extent of the parent
company's financial responsibility to the victims. The parties will be
much better served by resolving this dispute in a flexible, non-adversarial
private, equitable and expeditious way. ADR techniques are eminently
suited to provide a setting for this to happen.
V. CONCLUSION
Who is to blame here? Certainly there is plenty of blame to go
around and the recipients include Union Carbide, UCIL. and the govern-
ments of India and Madhya Pradesh. And while the issues of liability,
adequate amount of compensation, and strategies to resolve the Bhopal
controversy are of great significance and ought to concern us, the issues
often ignored relate to the Bhopal victims for whom the bell continues to
toll.
Consequently, what is of utmost concern is to devise ways to ensure
justice for the Bhopal victims in the long run and to make certain that
cific Way" (Working Draft Paper for Multidisciplinary Symposium at the Hague Academy
of International Law, Nov. 1984); Patton, Settling Environmental Disputes: The Experi-
ence with and Future of Environmental Mediation, 14 ENVTL. L. 547 (1984); Stein, The
Settlement of Environmental Disputes: Towards a System of Flexible Dispute Settlement,
12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 283 (1985); Susskind & Weinstein, Toward a Theory of Environ-
mental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311 (1981); and Wald, Negotiations
of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1985).
137. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 135, at 88-89. I am grateful
to me colleague John Barkai for his helpful suggestions in my study of ADR techniques to
resolve the Bhopal controversy.
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their immediate relief and rehabilitation needs are appropriately met.
Notwithstanding haphazard efforts thus far, the Bhopal victims have not
received substantial aid. It is imperative that to provide them the needed
assistance a special Bhopal fund be established, which is efficiently ad-
ministered by nongovernmental agencies, and is funded principally by
Union Carbide. 38
Thus, while international efforts at seeking long-range solutions to
intricate problems, such as, transfer of hazardous technologies and prod-
ucts, especially to developing states, are essential, the immediate and ur-
gent problem in the Bhopal case concerns the wellbeing of the victims
and their families. Similarly, while the courts further refine the doctrine
of forum non conveniens and find expeditious adjudicatory procedures to
resolve complex tort litigation, I consider it a massive disservice to the
victims of the Bhopal catastrophe if the parties do not make good faith
efforts to find an out-of-court settlement. And, the sooner, the better.
138. On April 2, 1987, the new Judge hearing the Bhopal case, Judge M. W. Deo, asked
Union Carbide and the Indian government to agree to interim compensation for the Bhopal
victims. He said that after having gone through the records he had been left with "a strong
impression that there is in store a grand, long-drawn battle for the poor gas victim who is
gasping with his already gas-afftected respiratory system." Majpuria, Judge Asks Interim
Bhopal Payment, India Abroad, April 10, 1987, at 1, col. 1,2.
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